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Abstract 
 Grand corruption maintains a firm grip on the Nigerian economic, 
social and political system despite the existence of numerous anti-corruption 
institutional bodies and the justice system. Grand corruption is the sore spot 
in Nigeria’s pursuit of transparency and accountability in governance and has 
ensured the continuous neglect of the rule of law and due process, national 
underdevelopment, violation of socio-economic rights and insecurity. This 
paper, using the metaphor of “cancer” appraises the endemic grand 
corruption in Nigeria in the light of “open letters” exchanged between two 
prominent former Nigerian Presidents. It argues that the contents of the “two 
presidential letters” places moral mandate on Nigerians to renew the 
commitment towards combating grand corruption, particularly with the 
emergence of a new administration whose agenda portends a policy of zero 
tolerance to corruption. The paper is a qualitative desk-based research using 
secondary data obtained from laws of the country on corruption; reports from 
Nigerian anti-corruption agencies; court records and cases; reports from 
newspapers and magazines; articles in journals and books; reports from 
websites of developmental agencies and the civil society organisations. The 
paper recommends the strengthening of the anti-corruption agencies, law 
reforms and national reorientation through mass education and mobilisation 
with the aim of combating the cancer of endemic grand corruption in 
Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
 Human Rights Watch (December 12 2013) refers to Nigeria’s grand 
corruption as a culture of impunity as the nation “…made little progress in 
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combating corruption in the public sector”. Similarly, Akin Oyebode (2001, 
603) argues that “recent scandals rocking the present civilian administration 
in Nigeria has given force to the assertion that corruption can be said to have 
become our fundamental objective and directive principle of state policy”. 
On how corruption escalated in the country, there is a widely held belief that 
military incursion into governance was largely to be blamed. In addition, the 
unwillingness of most of the succeeding civilian governments to effectively 
tackle the menace contributed to the seemingly uncontrollable spate of 
corruption in the country. The notoriety of grand corruption in Nigeria is 
observed in most academic literature on corruption citing Nigeria as a vivid 
example of an economy ravaged by endemic grand corruption (Susan Rose-
Ackerman, 1998, 2012; Alina Mungui Pippidi, 2006; John Mbaku, 2010; 
Martine Boersma, 2013; Arvind Jain, 2001; Dan Hough 2013; Daniel 
Kaufmann, 1997; Heidenheimer, A & Johnson, M 2002; C. Albin-Lackey, 
2013; Kolawole Olaniyan, 2014; Bolaji Owasanoye, 2015). 
 The effects of corruption in Nigeria are devastating and well 
discussed in the literature. For example, the empirical findings on the level of 
corruption in Nigeria from data obtained from the World Bank and the 
Transparency International Indexes (TI) is mind boggling, and widely 
discussed in both academic and non-academic literatures on corruption. 
Former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, baffled by the level of 
corruption in Nigeria, in December 2013 wrote an 18 page publicly 
disseminated letter titled “Before It Is Too Late” to the then incumbent 
President, Goodluck Jonathan, accusing him of complicity in the endemic 
grand corruption ravaging the Nigerian polity. Excerpt from the letter reads: 
“Most of our friends and development partners ….are worried 
about corruption and what we are doing or not doing about 
it… Corruption has reached the level of impunity. 
It  is  also  necessary  to  be  mindful  that  corruption  and  inj
ustice are fertile breeding ground for terrorism and political 
instability. We must all remember that corruption, inequality 
and injustice and injustice breed poverty, unemployment, 
conflict, violence and wittingly or unwittingly create 
terrorists… May God grant you the grace for at least one 
effective correction against high corruption, which stink all 
around you in your government”. 
 The letter was quite unprecedented and a paradox of a sort as not 
only did it come from a past President who was accused of the same offence, 
but also a strong political ally of the then President, Goodluck Jonathan. The 
letter highlights the implications of uncontrolled grand corruption and in 
particular, the consequences on human rights in Nigeria and the need for 
urgent action. Former President Jonathan replied to the letter unequivocally 
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denying personal involvement in most accusations contained in the letter, but 
was very emphatic in stating:  
“That corruption is an issue in Nigeria is indisputable. It has been 
with us for many years... the seed of corruption in this country was 
planted a long time ago ....I can hardly be blamed if the wheels of 
justice still grind very slowly in our country” (Vanguard, 23 Dec 
2013; BBC News Africa, 23 December, 2013).  
 Obasanjo and Jonathan had a unique convergence of discourse in the 
sense that both attests to the existence of systemic grand corruption in 
Nigeria. Anna Tibaiujka captures the essence of this paper in this statement: 
“it is not enough to say that people …are corrupt, but to ask who is 
corrupting them and how do we deal with them” (Tibaiujka, 2005 cited in 
John Hatchard, 2014:11).  
 This paper inquires if grand corruption is the cancer of Nigeria. What 
are the human rights implications of grand corruption in Nigeria? Why has 
the Economic and the Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a major anti-
corruption agency in Nigeria failed to effectively tackle the issue of grand 
corruption in Nigeria? The paper restates Chidi Odinkalu’s postulate, ‘how 
has a country so richly endowed blown the opportunities for itself and its 
generations yet unborn so spectacularly? (CLEEN Foundation, 2010:14). 
 
Grand Corruption in Nigeria? 
 Grand corruption refers to “the acts of the political elite by which 
they exploit their power to make economic policies … this occurs when a 
corrupt political elite change either the national policies or the 
implementation of national policies to serve its own interests at some cost to 
the populace” (Arvind Jain, 2001: 73-74). It involves high-ranking 
government officials cashing in on the dysfunctional institutions to steal 
public funds. Michael Ogbeidi argues that “Political [grand] corruption has 
become a cancerous phenomenon that pervades the Nigerian state 
unrestrained” (Ogbeidi, 2012:5). This assertion alludes to “Cancer of 
Corruption” (Wolfensohn Speech) at The World Bank, in 1996. 
 The spate of grand corruption remains unaffected by Nigeria’s 
domestic anti-corruption initiatives, and undermines its commitment to the 
ratified regional and international treaties. Thus, while there are a myriad of 
anticorruption laws, Nigeria remains one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world. The existence of abundant natural resources has unfortunately 
presented a case of the natural resource curse (Shaxson, 2007) and a paradox 
of lack amidst plenty. The existence of huge petroleum deposits guaranteed 
excess revenue for Nigeria, which to a large extent triggered the propensity 
to loot the public treasury (Duruigbo, 2005). Hence, it is pertinent to ask, 
how did Nigeria get so entangled with grand corruption? 
European Scientific Journal February 2016 edition vol.12, No.5  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
14 
 The history of grand corruption originated from the colonial times, 
according to Stephen Pierce (2006:888) as “British authorities complained 
about governmental corruption from the very beginning of the colonial 
period”. Bernard Storey (1953) asserts that “before independence, there have 
been cases of official misuse of resources for personal enrichment”. Over the 
years, Nigeria has seen its wealth withered with little to show in the living 
conditions of the citizens due to high-level corruption in the public sectors. 
The immediate post-colonial administrations failed due to complicity with 
corruption. 
 The emergence of the military in the Nigerian political sphere 
worsened the corruption issues in Nigeria. Prominently, the massive looting 
of the public treasury by former military president General Ibrahim 
Babangida who is yet to account for the sum of US$12.67 billion earned 
during the Iraq/Gulf war exceptional oil boom (Agbiboa, 2013) and late 
General Sani Abacha, his family and accomplices (Ezeani, 2005) who looted 
the treasury of Nigeria to the tune of about US $50 billion is typical evidence 
of military institutionalised grand corruption. Despite the various compelling 
evidence against Babaginda’s complicity in grand corruption as pointed out 
by the Okigbo Panel (Okigbo Panel Report, 1994) and the pursuit and 
repatriation of some of Abacha’s loot from various foreign funds linked to 
him, no meaningful domestic prosecution was initiated against them. Former 
President Babangida walks free today in Nigeria while the Abacha family 
received presidential pardon for perpetrating massive treasury loot against 
Nigerians (Berne Declaration, 2015).  
 After the return of democratic governance in Nigeria, the civilian 
administrations of President Obasanjo, Yaradua and Goodluck Jonathan 
instead of concertedly tackling grand corruption, further escalated the 
already volatile situation leading to prominent grand corruption scandals 
including: the Halliburton affair (United States v KBR LLC), 
Alamieyeseigha’s case (Federal Republic of Nigeria v Alamieyeseigha), 
Ibori’s case (Ayogu and Agbor, 2014: 359), Tafa Balogun’s case (Human 
Rights Watch, July 2005 Vol 17, No. 11 (A), Joshua Dariye’s case (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria v. Dariye);  the missing $20 billion dollar petroleum 
revenue case (Financial Times, 13 May 2015) and the recent looted National 
security funds by Colonel Sambo Dasuki running into billions of dollars 
(BBC News 1 December, 2015; Newsweek Europe 2 December, 2015) are 
just a few of the numerous grand corruption cases that have challenged 
Nigeria’s transparency and integrity.  
 In a particular and spectacular case, a former governor of the oil-rich 
Delta State, James Ibori was convicted by the Southwark Crown Court in 
London of money laundering offences involving USD $67 million after 
extradition from the United Arab Emirates to stand trial in the United 
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Kingdom (Albin-Lackey, 2013: 155). Ibori was sentenced to 13 years in 
prison in the United Kingdom on 17 April 2012 (The Wall Street Journal, 17 
April 2012; Manga Fombad and Choe Fombad, 2015). Apart from the fact 
that this case exposed the brazen level of grand corruption in Nigeria, a 
major issue that comes to mind from the analysis of Ibori’s case is a question 
of why a Nigerian court previously absolved him of the charges on similar 
offences. In this regard, Transparency International (5 Oct 2015) submits 
“the case of James Ibori is fresh in mind as the Nigerian court declared him 
not guilty while a court in the United Kingdom arrested, investigated and 
prosecuted him”. Does it mean that the laws in Nigeria are wrongly crafted 
or that the judiciary is ineffective? According to Albin-Lackey (2013:155), 
the answer tends to be holistic as “Ibori was renowned for fuelling 
widespread corruption and political violence”, and the rot in the judiciary 
facilitated the “dismissal of charges against the well-connected former 
governor” (Jain, 2013:155; Human Rights Watch, April 17 2012).  Jain 
(2001:3) concurs that a “weak and judicial system becomes a cause and 
consequence of corruption”. The Transparency International (October 5 
2015) maintains that “we therefore insist that the Nigerian judiciary becomes 
more credible by redeeming itself to restore confidence and make justice 
reliable to prosecute those who mismanaged funds while in office”. 
 Human Rights Watch (2014) bemoaned the state pardon granted to 
the late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha by former President Jonathan arguing that 
it is “a major setback in ending impunity for corruption among political 
officeholders”. Alamieyeseigha was the only governor to have served a 
prison term in Nigeria. The presidential pardon granted to Alamieyeseigha 
not only sent the wrong signals locally and internationally, but confirmed the 
reasoning that certain Nigerians are untouchable and has cast serious doubt 
on the sincerity of the state to combat grand corruption. 
 Moreover, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi alleged that the sum of about $20 billion Dollars was 
unaccounted for by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
Human Rights Watch states that in February 2014, the government 
suspended Sanusi for whistle blowing against the NNPC (Human Rights 
Watch). To date, Sanusi insists on the veracity of his claims (Financial 
Times, 13 May 2015), and it took another similar corruption allegation, this 
time, made by another ex-governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, Charles 
Soludo (Premium Times, 26 Jan. 2015), for former President Jonathan to be 
prompted to hurriedly declare publicly that he has received the result of the 
forensic financial audit conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) on 
the missing $20 billion dollar allegation. The forensic audit concludes that 
US$1.48billion was truly misappropriated thereby giving credence to 
Sanusi’s allegation (This Day, 3 February 2015), even though this fell short 
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of Sanusi’s initial projection of US $20 billion. Currently, the dissipation of 
the $32 billion dollars meant for arms procurement in order to fight the 
threats of Boko Haram terrorism by the former National Security adviser, 
Sambo Dasuki, has reinforced the firm grip of grand corruption in Nigeria 
(BBC News, 14 December 2015; This Day, 2 December 2015).  
  
A Critical Reflection 
 Several reported grand corruption scandals in Nigeria point to the 
conclusion that corruption in Nigeria is cancerous, and has metastasised 
throughout the body politic. No sector is spared and the public office holders 
act with impunity against the public interest while their greed impoverishes 
the lives of many (Owasanoye, 2014).  Nigeria remains a captured state and 
faces the consequences of the natural resource curse. Hence, it is pertinent to 
ask, why are we stifled by these scandals? Are the laws deficient or are the 
citizens amoral? Discussing the questions is desirable, not only because it 
has the potential to assist in combating grand corruption in the country, but 
according to the World Bank (30 January 2013), this discourse matters 
because the consequences of corruption include: “corruption diverts 
resources from the poor to the rich, increases the cost of running businesses, 
distorts public expenditures and deters foreign investors…it is a major 
barrier to sound and equitable development... it restricts access to services 
for the most vulnerable citizens and is associated with a lower quality of 
public services”.  
 Thus, Irene Pogoson (2009:77) reiterates that “combating corruption, 
especially in a country like Nigeria where it is endemic, pervasive, and deep-
rooted, must involve much more than the promulgation of laws and setting 
up an independent commission. To be effective, an anticorruption regime 
must involve multifaceted strategies that address the underlying structural 
and social problems that spur corruption”. Olaniyan (2014:4) argues 
differently insisting that the fight against corruption in Nigeria fails because 
the laws are most often approached from a criminal law and enforcement 
dimension, devoid of human right ingredients that put the victims in focus 
with guarantees for their human rights protection. Olaniyan (2014:8) further 
posits that the application of such a “restrictive approach” is fundamentally 
flawed, the “approach has proved counter-productive, thus making durable 
and sustainable solutions to the problem elusive”. Olaniyan (2014:8) further 
criticises the justice system as paying lip service to the prosecution of 
corruption in Nigeria, adding that “comparatively, few high-ranking officials 
are prosecuted, and corruption cases that are taken to court proceed at a 
snail’s pace and serve no more than a symbolic purpose”. This paper takes 
the stance that the anti-corruption battle could be better fought where it 
incorporates human right elements in addition to the review and updating of 
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the most obsolete laws in Nigeria to reflect the realities of today. For 
instance, the sanctions available for most serious corruption cases are a 
parody of the legislative and executive commitment to tackle the menace in 
the country. An example is the penalty of N750,000 given by Justice Talba’s 
judgment  in the Police pension fund case of N23 billion which made a 
mockery of the judicial system (Premium Times, 16 February 2013; 
SERAP). This paper also advocates the involvement of civil society 
organisations in the State’s ongoing and future strategy in executing the 
battle against corruption (The Guardian, 9 December 2015). 
 The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) 
argue that the government meddles with the statutory roles of the anti-
corruption agencies to the extent that “governments have not allowed them 
to perform their statutory duties independently and effectively” (SERAP, 
2006). Some writers argue strongly that regimes without strong political will 
to combat grand corruption are totally dishonest with their intents (Mbaku, 
2010: 145). This paper argues that the failure of the anti- corruption agencies 
is mostly tied to insincerity in initiating reforms, lack of autonomy of the 
anti-corruption agencies from the executive arm of the government, 
deficiency of laws which exclude human rights considerations, obsolete 
criminal law procedures, and discriminatory prosecutorial practices. 
 Grand corruption thus implies that the “State is not taking steps in the 
right direction, for instance, when funds are stolen by corrupt officials, or 
when access to healthcare, education and housing is dependent on bribes, a 
state’s resources are clearly not being used maximally to realize economic, 
social and cultural rights” (Albin-Lackey, 2013:148). In Nigeria, such public 
stealing with impunity appears to be institutionalised. Recent examples 
include the embezzlement of pension fund contributed by civil servants by a 
cartel comprising of top ranking public servants (Ubhenin, 2012:289-304); 
the looting of funds accruing from petroleum sales by the Petroleum 
Ministry and the infamous diversion of the $32 billion fund meant for the 
defence arms procurement against terrorism (BBC News, 1 December 2015; 
This Day, 10 December 2015). 
  
Human Rights Implications of Grand Corruption 
 Grand Corruption is the massive stealing of public resources that 
would have been invested in providing wealth-creating infrastructure and 
social services for the citizenry by public office holders whose primary 
duties among others is the protection and judicious use of the national 
resources for public interest and good. According to ActionAid, “corrupt 
behaviours have eroded the institutional capacity of governments and 
ministries to deliver quality public services such as education, health, 
infrastructure, etc” (2015:11). These basic rights are the basic sustenance 
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often referred to as socio-economic rights. Grand corruption has also 
affected the realisation of certain civil and political rights. 
 The looting, embezzlement and diversion of public funds mean that 
the realisation of the basic human rights is adversely affected. For example, 
the Universal Basic Education programme (UBE) in Nigeria presents a 
typical case where funds budgeted for educational purposes were embezzled 
by public servants resulting in the denial of the right to education to some 
people.  In SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic 
Education Commission, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, SERAP alleged the violation 
of the right to quality education, the right to dignity, the right of peoples to 
their wealth and natural resources and the right of peoples to economic and 
social development guaranteed by Articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The ECOWAS Court ruled that the 
right to education can be enforced before the Court and dismissed all 
objections brought by the Federal Government of Nigeria through the 
Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), that education is a mere 
directive policy of the government and not a legal entitlement of the citizens. 
The ECOWAS ruling indicts the Nigerian government because a responsible 
government is legally and morally obliged to render certain services free to 
the populace. Moreover, the quantum deaths of Nigerians on Nigerian roads 
due to preventable accidents caused by non-execution of duly awarded road 
contracts is another denial of human rights caused by endemic grand 
corruption. Grand corruption ensures that the road contracts and maintenance 
jobs are awarded to the wrong companies due to lack of transparency and 
due process in the tender processes. Many Nigerians die daily from 
preventable diseases due to the dilapidated state of the hospital 
infrastructures in the nation. There is now the vogue of “medical tourism” by 
the elites who could afford to secure treatments overseas but the poor are left 
to die as a result of dysfunctional medical infrastructures (Vanguard, 12 May 
2014; Al Jazeera, 8 January 2014). ActionAid submits that “the poor in 
Nigeria live in unhygienic and insecure environments with limited access to 
medical facilities, electricity, water and other basic services” (2015:23). 
 The right to life is endangered due to the threat of Boko Haram 
terrorism which arguably has been sustained by the systemic grand 
corruption in Nigeria (Anaedozie, 2015:13; Idahosa, 2015). This is also tied 
to inability of the Nigerian government to accede to the constitutional 
mandate of providing security for the citizenry as stipulated in Chapter 11 of 
the 1999 Constitution, relating to the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
of State Policy in Section 2 (b). This portends serious human rights 
consequence as the right to life is a fundamental human right that should be 
protected at all times. It is obvious that thousands of lives have been lost 
particularly in north-eastern Nigeria due to Boko Haram terrorism (The 
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Economist, 18 November 2015). Funds earmarked for the procurement and 
execution of other logistics in the battle against terrorism were deliberately 
diverted into private pockets thereby leaving soldiers and other security 
operatives to confront the terrorists with outdated, unserviceable weaponry 
and sometimes without weapons. It got to a point that the soldiers were 
absconding from the battle fronts due to lack of weapons to fight with. This 
gave Boko Haram an upper hand, emboldened them to the extent that they 
killed and abducted many civilians and service men and went ahead to 
establish their Caliphates in the North East region of Nigeria. 
 The core of the human rights argument in this section, though not 
exhaustive is that the impact of grand corruption through the massive looting 
of the public treasury falls on the ordinary people. Their socio-economic 
needs will simply not be met “when the resources to provide those needs are 
stolen, diverted into private pockets, and then stashed abroad” (Olaniyan, 
2014: 206). As it stands, Nigeria has no sustainable social policy for the 
elimination of poverty like the provision of housing, health care, food, water, 
education and shelter. These are rights tied to the sustenance of human life 
and are particularly relevant to the vulnerable, marginalised and 
disadvantaged groups. 
 The causal link with human rights exist in the corruption discourse as 
according to President Buhari, “when you see dilapidated infrastructure 
round the country, it is often the consequence of corruption. Poor healthcare, 
collapsed education, lack of public utilities, decayed social services, are all 
products of corruption as those entrusted with public resources put them in 
their private pockets” (Nigerian Tribune, 11 Dec 2015). 
 
Revisiting the Presidential Open Letters 
 The publication of the 18 page Presidential open letters in December 
2013 catalysed the polity so much that there were denials, accusations, 
counter accusations and editorials in the local and international news. A lot 
of people saw the letter written by Obasanjo as a form of witch-hunt by an 
embittered oligarch who lost his grip on his captured prey. However, reading 
the letters from an objective point of view and despite the challenges 
Obasanjo’s regime had with its anti-corruption policies, it appears that he 
seemed to be stating the obvious. Relying on the contents of Obasanjo’s 
letter to Goodluck Jonathan and juxtaposing it with the grand corruption 
scandals at hand, Obasanjo’s letter could be argued to have depicted what 
could be the Michel Nostradamus of our time, the man who saw Nigeria’s 
tomorrow. The ongoing corruption enquiries and arrests tied to the National 
Security Adviser’s office and the missing $20 billion oil revenue appears to 
have vindicated Obasanjo’s letter. There is now empirical evidence to sustain 
the assertion that grand corruption has become the cancer of Nigeria. It 
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permeates every sector of the national economy and circulates in a vicious 
cycle. It becomes clear that corruption is no longer the exclusive reserve of 
the military. Former Presidents Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha were 
complicit, but the civilian regimes after the military tenures have evidently 
aggravated the situation. Evidence suggests that the office of the National 
Security Adviser was turned into a conduit for siphoning funds from the 
national treasury (Financial Times, 18 November 2015). The report of a 
further missing $20 billion oil revenue by the erstwhile Central Bank 
Governor and the indictment of the National Security Adviser, Colonel 
Sambo Dasuki of looting and laundering billions of dollars meant for 
combating Boko Haram insurgency epitomises the pervasiveness of grand 
corruption within the system. According to the news report of the Punch 
newspaper dated 11 December, 2015, the former Finance Minister, Okonjo-
Iweala agreed that she transferred $322million from the looted funds 
recovered from the late Gen. Sani Abacha, to the Office of the NSA for 
military operations in the North-East. Reacting through her Media Adviser, 
Mr. Paul Nwabuikwu, Okonjo-Iweala stated that the transfer of the fund was 
approved after a Committee set up by former President Jonathan gave 
approval for the use of the money and based on the decision of the 
Committee, she personally requested that part of the recovered fund be used 
for security operations while the rest be channelled into developmental 
purposes. On the contrary, the funds were never used for security operations 
as indicated above rather, they were diverted into private accounts of the 
political allies of former president Jonathan (Financial Times, 18 November 
2015).  These events expose how the office of the National Security Adviser 
was used by the oligarchs to consolidate their capture of the state by ensuring 
that state departments become money laundry and financial conduit 
accessories from where state funds are siphoned with imaginary projects 
linked to national security expenses and projects. Similar phoney projects 
tied to the Defence Ministry’s votes was also relied upon by the late General 
Sani Abacha to loot the national treasury. Those formed part of the Abacha 
loot that is still been repatriated to Nigeria by Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, USA and other countries used as safe havens by Abacha (Stolen 
Assets Recovery STaR Initiative, 2007). 
 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) a Crippled 
Giant? 
 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is the most 
prominent anti-corruption agency in Nigeria vested with the duties of 
fighting economic and financial crimes in the state. In 2003, former 
President Olusegun Obasanjo established the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) three years after the establishment of the 
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Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). The EFCC is 
empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and 
financial crimes and is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the 
provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic and financial 
crimes including: money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any 
form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking, 
child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign 
exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of 
intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic 
wastes, and prohibited goods (EFCC Establishment Act, (2004) as amended 
in 2007). The Commission is also responsible for identifying, tracing, 
freezing, confiscating, or seizing proceeds derived from terrorist activities. 
EFCC is also host to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), vested 
with the responsibility of collecting suspicious transaction reports (STRs) 
from financial and designated non-financial institutions, analysing and 
disseminating them to all relevant government agencies and other Financial 
Intelligent Units all over the world (EFCC Establishment Act, (2004) as 
amended in 2007). 
 The EFCC right from inception was construed to be at the forefront 
of the government’s anti-corruption project. The high expectation placed on 
EFCC has placed serious pressure on the need to investigate and prosecute a 
number of high profile corruption cases. While the EFCC has achieved some 
high profile convictions, it is faced with the challenge of remaining an 
efficient, independent and unbiased commission in the midst of 
unprecedented ongoing corruption scandals, political intrigues, monetised 
politics and judicial impropriety. Critics blame the EFCC for not doing 
enough to stop the endemic grand corruption in Nigeria. (Owasanoye, 
2014:22) graphically showed the amounts allegedly embezzled from Federal 
level (N22, 306,600,000) to the State Government level (N154,111, 800,000) 
in Nigeria.  
Figure 1 
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Source: Bolaji Owasanoye (2014:16). 
 The figure in Owasanoye’s book presented graphically above 
challenges the integrity of EFCC and puts its effectiveness under intense 
scrutiny. The obvious observation is that, despite the legislative and 
executive backing, the EFCC has performed relatively lower, for instance, 
than the Hong Kong system after which it was modelled (Rose Ackerman 
1999:158-162). The EFCC is also criticised for over-reliance on “plea 
bargaining”, a notorious bargain chip regularly used by the EFCC for 
obtaining settlement for most of the celebrated cases. It now appears that 
indicted corrupt Nigerian officials rely on “plea bargaining” as a legal way of 
circumventing the full legal sanctions for indulging in corrupt acts. Plea 
bargaining, of American origin is a legal process that allows “prosecutors 
and trial judges offer defendants concessions in exchange for their pleas” 
(Albert Alschuler, 1968:50).  It consists of the exchange of official 
concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction. One of the most 
prominent corrupt families in Nigeria, the Abacha clan, is known to have 
entered into plea bargain to keep $1billion of their loot in order to facilitate 
the family’s return of over $100 billion of the looted funds to the federal 
government (This Day, 3 July 2014; SERAP, 2015). While this defeats good 
moral principle and accountability, the Nigerian government was happy to 
agree to the deal arguing that “they saved Nigeria exorbitant legal fees and 
ended an endless case” (Jubril Oke, 2012:345). The process of “plea bargain” 
as used by the EFCC was cited also by Inyang, Peter and Ejor (2014) as an 
impediment to stamping out corruption in Nigeria. Through this process, 
indicted corrupt officials merely relinquish a part of their loot while still 
enjoying the remainder, and at the same time evading prison terms. (Inyang 
et al; 2014; Olaniyan, 2014: 9). This sends the wrong signals to the public 
that after all, it is still profitable to be corrupt. Human Rights Watch 
identifies cases against, Tafa Balogun, the former police Chief, Lucky 
Igbinedon, former Edo State governor, the late Diepreye Alamieyesiegha 
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former governor of the oil rich Bayelsa state and Chief Olabode George, the 
former chairman of the Nigerian Ports Authority as among the key plea 
bargain cases that involved dropping some of the most serious charges 
against the accused (Human Rights Watch, 25 August 2011). 
 A cursory look at EFCC caseloads show list of some prominent 
public office holders indicted for misappropriating public funds. The 
consequence of their acts was the aggravation of poverty rates in their 
respective states. ActionAid Nigeria laments that “If the monies of the states 
were judiciously deployed they would have had a more positive impact on 




Table 1: Some of the Prominent Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) High 
Profile Cases involving some Past/Serving State Governors Indicted on Corruption. 
Name of Public 
Official/Officer 
 
Amount Misused/Converted Poverty Rates  2004    
2010 
 
Ayo Fayose (Ekiti State) 
 
N1.2billion 
40            40 
Joshua Dariye (Plateau State) N700million 49            54 
Michael Botmang (Plateau 
State) 
N1.5 billion 49           54 
Saminu Turaki (Jigawa State) N36 billion 87           78 
Orji Uzo Kalu (Abia State) 
N5b26 30 
N5 billion 26           30 
James Ibori (Delta State) N9.2 billion 56         42 
Lucky Igbinedion (Edo State) N4.3 billion 38        43 
jolly Nyame (Taraba State) N180million 44         48 
Chimaroke 
Nnamani (Enugu State) 
N5.3 billion 32         48 
Source: Source: EFCC, “Ongoing Cases”, in Bolaji Aluko, April 28, 2010 and NBS, 2012 
cited in ActionAid 2015. 
 
 The publication of the high-profile cases on EFCC website shows 
that despite the gains made by the EFCC, the problem of grand corruption 
continues to soar. ActionAid argues that “it is certainly energetic in obtaining 
convictions across the federation, but a glance at its convictions records 
show that these relate mostly to financial crimes by individuals (such as 
conspiracy to steal, obtaining money by false pretences, theft, and so on), 
rather than official corruption” (2015:48). Human Rights Watch (25 August 
2011) disagrees with the purported gains of EFCC’s “high profile cases” 
arguing that: 
“in term of pure numbers, the sum total of the EFCC 
convictions of nationally prominent political figures is 
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underwhelming: a mere four convictions in eight years - 
between 2003 and July 2011. This represents less than 5% of 
the total high profile corruption cases between 2003 and 
2011”.  
 Thus, while the existence of these institutional and legal frameworks 
directly confirms the endemic nature of grand corruption in Nigeria, the 
institutional framework like the EFCC that is backed by enabling legislation 
has not been effective to stem the tide of grand corruption. The question is 
why is this so? Is it a question of law enforcement or issues with the legal 
framework? Oko (2001-2002) argues that the laws on corruption in Nigeria 
are carefully crafted and issues of pervasive corruption have nothing to do 
with legal drafting. In other words, by implication, anti-corruption 
frameworks and agencies may be gimmicks employed by some states as 
ploys for attracting donor funds whereas there is no evidence of political will 
to back the anti-corruption projects (Oko, 2002:404). Some writers argue 
strongly that regimes without strong political will to combat grand corruption 
are totally dishonest with their intents (Mbaku, 2010:145). For instance, 
Okojie and Momoh (2005: 112) suggest that anti-corruption laws and 
initiatives fail because countries enter into bilateral or multilateral treaties on 
anti-corruption without a sincere desire to implement them. This is contrary 
to the original intent of both bilateral and multilateral development agencies 
that “have placed anti-corruption strategies at the heart of their efforts to 
strengthen governance in beneficiary countries” (Bracking, 2005: x). 
Arguably, donor treaties in systemic corrupt nations proliferate for the 
purpose of satisfying the demands of international financier. The extent of 
the veracity of this claim is an area worth researching further considering the 
fact that Nigeria is a signatory to anti-corruption treatise, yet remains 
ravaged by systemic grand corruption.  
 The EFCC argue somewhat differently on why they have been 
performing below the public expectation. EFCC argue that Nigeria’s 
situation is critical and the agency is overwhelmed by exceptional high 
incidence of corruption at the public and the private sectors (Ribadu, 2004b). 
The unending list of cases catalogued on its website shows how critical the 
situation is. EFCC blame mostly the justice system that permits accused 
persons to use frivolous technicalities to delay the course of justice and this 
is often done in orchestrated conspiracy and connivance of some lawyers and 
court judges (Ribadu, 2004b). Other reasons given by the EFCC includes: 
budgetary constraints and issues associated with funding, court 
administrative bureaucracy involving transfer and promotion of judges; court 
congestion and undue slow pace of court proceedings as some of the 
drawbacks precluding it from satisfactory performance (Magu, 2015). EFCC 
has also been criticised for lack of staff with the necessary expertise in 
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prosecuting corruption offences (Obua, 2010). Cases abound where technical 
lapses from the EFCC has defeated or prolonged cases unduly. There are also 
issues of weak evidence presented at trials as well as hostile and 
uncooperative witnesses. To draw home this argument, how can EFCC list 
about 100-150 count charges on a given case? (Punch, 18 January 2016). The 
charges listed for instance, in the case of Raymond Dokpesi of DAAR 
Communications accused of complicity in the $32 billion arms fund supports 
this argument. It is this type of lapse in legal technicality that has surrounded 
most of the unduly prolonged EFCC cases and explains what Bolaji 
Owasanoye (2014) highlights as “high profile corruption cases crawling or 
gone to sleep”. 
 Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the EFCC has succeeded in 
achieving some high profile convictions. According to the present chairman 
of the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu, the EFCC is set to achieve increased numbers 
of convictions under the provisions of the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Act, (ACJA) 2015. This revolutionary Act has emboldened the EFCC by 
removing most of the hurdles in the way of corruption prosecution. Most 
cases previously left in abeyance due to technicalities can now be 
resuscitated as section 15 of the ACJA, 2015 empowers the EFCC to 
investigate all corruption cases including, those with subsisting court 
injunctions. As a result, corruption cases with perpetual injunctions like the 
case of Peter Odili, the former governor of Rivers State would be re-opened 
(Daily Post, 17 Dec 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
 Corruption is not a victimless crime. It affects and impacts directly on 
individuals and by so doing affect the rights of vulnerable people. To address 
the key question driving this article, it appears that empirical evidence 
supports the claims that corruption is indeed the cancer of Nigeria. While 
this article is not intended to chronicle exhaustively the corruption scandals 
in Nigeria, evidence from the corruption scandals addressed points to the 
systemic and endemic grand corruption in Nigeria. It is daunting that both 
former Presidents agree that Nigeria is plagued with endemic corruption, but 
at the same time, chose to play blame games rather than advocate sustainable 
ways of combating the malaise. This stands in stark contrast to Section 15 (5) 
of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that “the state shall abolish all 
corrupt practices and abuse of power”. 
 This paper attributes the non-realisation of socio-economic rights in 
Nigeria as a significant driver of endemic corruption as surplus funds in the 
polity may not strictly and legally be destined for public infrastructural 
growth and development due to constitutional limitations. The fact that no 
court in Nigeria is constitutionally empowered to adjudicate on socio-
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economic rights precludes people from seeking judicial remedy and this in 
turn, enables corrupt public servants to amass huge sums of money without 
any corresponding platform for accountability and transparency. 
Undoubtedly, one of the consequences of non-realisation of socio-economic 
rights in Nigeria is the avenue it creates for corrupt public officials and their 
associates to stash funds meant for national development in overseas safe 
havens. Therefore, it is not surprising that a cursory glimpse at the state of 
the nation would reveal dilapidated infrastructures, appalling healthcare 
facilities, crippled education system, lack of public utilities, decayed social 
services; all these are indicative of the betrayal of trust by those entrusted 
with public resources (Obua, 2010). While some well-meaning Nigerians 
have indulged in political activism to demand for the justiciability of socio-
economic rights in Nigeria, judicial activism nonetheless remains passive 
and overtly cautious. This has hindered the clamour for the justification of 
socio-economic rights thus presenting most Nigerian judges as failing to 
adopt more proactive measures as evidence in other jurisdictions like South 
Africa and India (Stanley Ibe, 2007; Mohammed Tanko, 2015).  
 To this effect, national treasury looters remain active and undeterred 
while it is shocking that even when stolen/looted funds are traced and 
repatriated through international collaborations, the same funds are re-looted 
shortly after repatriation by the senior officials that facilitated the tracing in 
the first place, a classic example being the disbursement of about $322 
million Abacha loot from the Ministry of Finance to the Office of the 
National Security Adviser (Olaniyan, 2014: 10; Punch, 11 Dec 2015). It is 
unfortunate that the Nigerian justice system has not effectively prosecuted 
most of the oligarchs that have held the state captive for a long time. A 
comparison with the sentencing of the former Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud 
Olmert (Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2014) and the son of the Senegalese ex-
President, Karim Wade (Daily Mail, 23 March 2015) drives home the 
argument of this paper that robust political will (Hatchard, 2014: 28-31) 
could go a long way in ameliorating the threats posed by the systemic grand 
corruption in Nigeria. Leaders with strong political will have eluded Nigeria 
for a long time (ActionAid Nigeria, 2015:16). Nigeria needs “the sense of 
fairness, rationality, compassion, patriotism and humanity in the ruling 
class…” (Fombad et al, 2015: 727) in order to combat the cancer of 
corruption. 
 This paper argues for exhaustive law and institutional reform in 
Nigeria, but the extent to which this could be achieved in the light of obvious 
weak and overburdened judiciary remains another topic worth investigating. 
With the coming into office of the new civilian regime led by President 
Muhammed Buhari which portends zero-tolerance for corruption, the 
appointment of a new Head for the anti-corruption agency (EFCC) and the 
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enactment of the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act (ACJ Act) 2015, 
it appears that there may be some glimmer of light within the dark tunnel of 
Nigerian grand corruption practices. For sceptics who wonder why the fuss 
about grand corruption, it is opportune to reflect on the South African 
constitutional Court ruling of Glenister v President of The Republic of South 
Africa & Ors (CCT48/10) [2011] ZACC 6, 176-77), establishing the close 
link between corruption and human rights. The Court held that: 
“There can be no gainsaying that corruption threatens to fell 
at the knees virtually everything we hold dear and precious in 
our hard-won constitutional order. It blatantly undermines the 
democratic ethos, the institutions of democracy, the rule of 
law and the foundational values of our nascent constitutional 
project. It fuels maladministration and public fraudulence and 
imperils the capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil all the rights enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights. When corruption and organised crime 
flourish, sustainable development and economic growth are 
stunted. And in turn, the stability and security of society is put 
at risk”. 
 Moreover, reading this in conjunction with the ECOWAS Court 
ruling on the justiciability of the right to education, it becomes obvious that 
corruption hinders the ability of States to combat poverty and also precludes 
States from delivering their human rights obligations. Thus, there are 
established legal precedents that emphasise that corruption is not just an 
abstract concept, but that it impacts adversely on people. Hence, reading 
from the jurisprudence of South Africa, it is damning that Nigerian courts are 
lagging behind in prosecuting corruption cases despite the backlog of high 
profile corruption cases pending in different courts before them 
(Owasanonye, 2014). It is also appalling that the Nigerian justice system 
sometimes uses technicalities in the form of frivolous and vexatious 
challenges to defeat the course of justice. According to Nuhu Ribadu, 
(2004b) it has “become an “art” for defence attorneys to ensure that financial 
crime cases do not go and substantive cases are never tried on their merits. 
Defence attorneys delay and prolong cases by a tactic of applying for stay of 
proceedings. Where such application is not granted, they accuse judges of 
bias, which provide grounds for an application to transfer their cases to other 
judges”. In these circumstances, one question that resonates is where has the 
transparency and the independence of the judiciary gone to in Nigeria? Is the 
justice system no longer the hope of the common man? According to 
Transparency International (5 October, 2015): 
“we urge the Nigerian people to support this move [anti-
corruption] by the current Nigerian government and set aside 
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ethnic, religious, geographical or political affiliations, as this 
is the only way corruption can be curbed and all stolen 
monies used to foster the much needed development in the 
country. We urge the government of Nigeria to be steadfast 
and focused in the determination to ensure that corrupt 
individuals are brought to book and further ensure that all the 
leakages are blocked through strengthened public 
institutions”. 
 This paper submits that the letter written by former president 
Obasanjo to former President, Jonathan, was timely and a wake-up call to 
Nigerians. In essence, Obasanjo stated the obvious, and the reply he received 
from President Jonathan confirms that endemic grand corruption is the 
cancer of Nigeria and in the words of former World Bank’s President, James 
Wolfensohn “we need to deal with the cancer of corruption” (Wolfensohn, 
1996). The onus is on Nigerians to rise up to the challenge and deal with the 
“cancer of corruption” and this call is rekindled by the recent assertions of 
President Muhammed Buhari (Sun, 12 December 2015) that “without our 
collective will to resist corrupt acts as a people, it will be difficult to win the 
war. Nigeria has been brought almost to her knees by decades of corruption 
and mismanagement of the public treasury. We must come to a point when 
we must all collectively say enough is enough. If this country will realise her 
potentials, and take her rightful place in the comity of nations, we must 
collectively fight corruption to a standstill. If we don’t kill corruption, 
corruption will kill Nigeria”.  
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